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Comments
Right to Bear Arms in Pennsylvania: The
Regulation of Possession
Present gun control laws in the United States are simply inadequate.
In 1971, there were an estimated 17,360 murders committed through-
out the country,' and, as in the previous three years, approximately
65 per cent of these were committed with firearms.2 In the last decade,
this country has experienced the tragic assassinations by firearms of
President John F. Kennedy, Dr. Martin .Luther King, and Senator
Robert F. Kennedy, as well as the attempted assassination of Governor
George C. Wallace. Other violent crimes committed with firearms are
increasing at an alarming rate.3
After every assassination of a political figure and after every brutal
mass murder, the clamor for stricter gun control legislation is heard
throughout the nation. Inevitably, however, this clamor dies without
meaningful results as time dulls the memory of the populace. The
federal government has taken steps to remedy the problem of increased
violence4 but these attempts have not been successful. Unless Congress
finally comes to grips with the problem, the burden will fall upon the
individual states to enact firearm controls to halt the rising rate of
violent crime.
When a state legislature decides to enact firearms control legislation,
it is faced with constitutional provisions which may limit the scope of
that legislation. Both the United States Constitution and the constitu-
tions of the particular states will have to be studied to determine the
existence and the extent of such limitations. The purpose of this article
is an exploration and interpretation of the constitutional provisions
dealing with the right to bear arms. The discussion of the provisions
of the United States Constitution is applicable to all the states, but the
1. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 9 (1971).
2. Id. at 8.
3. Id. at 12. For example, aggravated assaults with firearms have increased 109 per
cent in the years 1966-1971.
4. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1968); Federal Firearms Act, Act of
June 30, 1938, ch. 850, § 9, 52 Stat. 1252; National Firearms Act of 1934, Act of June 26,
1934, ch. 757, § 18, 48 Stat. 1236.
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state constitutional provision discussed will be that of Pennsylvania.
There are sufficient historical and literal similarities between Penn-
sylvania's "right to bear arms" provision and those of the other states
to permit analogy and reference thereto.
I. GUN CONTROL AND THE SECOND' AMENDMENT
Invariably, a discussion of firearms control begins with a debate of
the interpretation of the second amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. This amendment provides that, "A well regulated militia,
being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to
keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." The language, "the right
. .. shall not be infringed," seems to indicate that neither the federal
nor state governments may infringe upon that right. A problem with
this literal interpretation is that the United States Supreme Court has
held, on three different occasions, that the proscription applies only
to the federal government. 5 As the Court stated in United States v.
Cruikshank:
The Second Amendment declares that it [the right to bear arms]
shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more
than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the
amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers
of the National Government .... 6
However, the three Supreme Court cases were decided when Barron
v. Mayor & City Council,7 was the prevailing rule for applying the
Bill of Rights to the states. That decision held that the first ten
amendments do not apply to the states. In view of the doctrine of
selective incorporation which applies various guarantees of the Federal
Bill of Rights against the states through application of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, these three holdings must be re-
examined.8 It is indeed possible that selective incorporation would ap-
ply the provisions of the second amendment to the states, providing the
same protections against state actions as those against the federal gov-
ernment. The purpose behind the second amendment was to protect
5. Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 588 (1876).
6. 92 U.S. at 591-92.
7. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
8. Cushman, Incorporation: Due Process and the Bill of Rights, 51 CORNELL L. REv.
467 (1966); Henkin, Selective Incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J.
74 (1963).
558
Vol. 11: 557, 1973
Comments
the states in the maintenance of their militia organizations against pos-
sible encroachment and dominance by the federal government. 9 In
colonial days there was a great fear of a national government with a
large standing army. The individual state militias were thought to be
the best protection against any dangers. The framers believed that these
militias would act as a deterrent against governmental oppression as
had occurred in England under King James II.10 The second amend-
ment was not, as it is often argued, imposed to give individuals the
right to protect themselves by use of firearms. The history of the
debates in Congress and of the state ratifying conventions lends no cre-
dence to the belief that personal self-protection was taken into con-
sideration when adopting the second amendment.1 The second amend-
ment was adopted as a collective right for the protection of the people
of the states' political framework, rather than as an individual right to
possess a firearm for self-protection. However, interpreting this right




Despite the constant rejection of the selective incorporation doctrine
by such Justices as Frankfurter and Harlan, 3 by the beginning of the
1960's, the Supreme Court began to add to the list of rights incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. This list has grown
as the doctrine has become firmly established.14 Deciding how the selec-
tive incorporation theory is applied is a difficult task since each Justice
seems to apply his own "test." Justice Stewart's "test" in Pointer v.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d
261 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 319 US. 463 (1943), citing THE FEDERALIST, NOS.
24-29 (A. Hamilton) and No. 46 (J. Madison); Eckert v. Pennsylvania, 331 F. Supp. 1361
(E.D. Pa. 1971).
10. Since most articles dealing with arms provisions give a detailed history of their
development, this comment will not be repetitive. For this history see R. POUND, TE
DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF LIBERTY 90 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
POUND]; Haight, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 2 Bmt, OF RIGHTS REV. 31 (1941); 28
HARv. L. REv. 473 (1915).
11. Feller & Gotting, The Second Amendment: A Second Look, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 46
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Feller & Gotting]; Comment, Constitutional Limitations of
Firearms Legislation, 1961 DuKE L.J. 773.
12. 31 ALBANY L. REV. 74, 80 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 672 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401,412 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Texas, seems appropriate for the second amendment-a particular Bill
of Rights guarantee will be incorporated into the fourteenth amend-
ment if it is a "fundamental guarantee of life and liberty. "15
An argument can be made that all of the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights are "fundamental" and thus incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court, however, by rejecting Justice Black's
approach that the fourteenth amendment applies the whole of the
Bill of Rights to the states, 18 has decided otherwise. Certainly, any
argument for possession of arms as a fundamental guarantee will cite
an early Georgia case Nunn v. Georgia. In 1846, the Georgia Supreme
Court stated that the right to bear arms is an "unalienable right which
lies at the bottom of every free government.' 7
Saying there is a fundamental right to private possession of firearms
to deter an oppressive government may indicate that the citizens have
a natural "right of revolution." Dean Roscoe Pound believed there
is no such right' and there is evidence that the founding fathers re-
jected such a notion.' 9
Recent cases have gone in opposite directions with regard to predict-
ing incorporation of the second amendment. In Eckert v. Pennsylva-
nia,20 the petitioner sought an injunction prohibiting the state's agents
from enforcing the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act,2 1 alleging it
to be in violation of the second amendment. The court held that the
statute did not violate the second amendment since "unless the posses-
sion of arms bears a reasonable relationship to the preservation or effi-
ciency of a well-regulated militia, there is no Second Amendment right
to such possession. ' 22 This district court unexplainedly applied a sec-
ond amendment limitation to a state statute; the only possible rationale
being that the second amendment is incorporated through the four-
teenth. The New Jersey Supreme Court has taken the opposite view.
In Burton v. Sills, that court was invited to accept the prediction that
"the [United States] Supreme Court will hereafter extend the restric-
tions of the Second Amendment to all of the States as it has done
15. 380 U.s. 400, 410 (1965).
16. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
17. 1 Ga. 245, 250 (1846). See also note 27 infra.
18. "[A] legal right of the citizens to wage war on the government is something which
cannot be admitted ...." POUND, supra note 10, at 90.
19. Feller & Gotting, supra note 11, at 67-68.
20. 331 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4628 (1963).
22. 331 F. Supp, at 1362.
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with some other amendments in the Bill of Rights." 23 The invitation
was declined.
There has been a recent trend by the Supreme Court to incorporate
an increasing number of the rights in the first ten amendments into the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, this trend
does not appear absolute, and there is no reason to believe that the
Court would incorporate the second amendment unless the right to
bear arms can be shown to be a fundamental guarantee of life and
liberty.
B. Composition of the "Militia"
Even if the second amendment is applied against the states through
the fourteenth amendment, such application does not determine its
limitation upon state legislation. This determination can be made only
by ascertaining the standards to be applied under the second amend-
ment.
There is logic to the proposition that the "well-regulated militia"
must be taken to mean the active, organized militia of each state,
which is characterized as the state National Guard. Today, with
the modem weapons of war in the hands of the federal government, the
concept of a state militia, of whatever composition, as an effective de-
terrent against national government oppression may be an outdated
one. This is so since it is impossible to achieve equality of armaments
with the federal government in the era of nuclear weapons. Still, the
state militia may serve a useful purpose in defending against foreign
invaders and domestic violence. However, the protection against for-
eign invasion has fallen to the United States standing army rather than
to the state National Guards. The only legitimate need for a state mili-
tia is to protect against internal strife and to aid, but not supplant, the
standing army in time of war. These functions can be adequately as-
sumed by the organized state militia rather than by individual citizens
without organization or training. "The day of the frontiersman, who
leaped to the defense of his town or state when the savage raised his
howl, is past."24 At least one state supreme court has accepted this defi-
nition of "militia." In Burton v. Sills, the New Jersey Supreme Court
23. 53 N.J. 86, 100, 248 A.2d 521, 528 (1968).
24. McKenna, The Right to Bear Arms, 12 MARQ. L. Rzv. 138, 148 (1928).
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held that New Jersey's gun control act did not violate either the terms
or purpose of the second amendment since the regulation did not "im-
pair the maintenance of the active, organized militias of the states."25
If this definition of "militia" is accepted by the United States Su-
preme Court, the effect of second amendment application to the states
through incorporation into the fourteenth amendment would only
prohibit the states from infringing upon the rights of those in the
organized militia to possess firearms in their official capacity. The states
could enact legislation consistent with the second amendment, prohibit-
ing the private ownership of all firearms as long as they provide, or
permit the federal government to supply, firearms to the National
Guard.26
This interpretation of "militia" is not the only one which has been
suggested. The second amendment refers to "the right of the people to
keep and bear arms." This language may infer that all able-bodied citi-
zens are members of the militia and thus have the right to individual
possession of firearms. At the time of the adoption of the second amend-
ment, the militia included every able-bodied adult male. The second
amendment would, therefore, seem to grant individuals the constitu-
tional right to keep and bear arms in order to be able to act in a mili-
tary capacity.27
The United States Supreme Court has twice indicated that the mili-
tia is composed of the entire male population.28 As early as 1886, in
Presser v. Illinois, the Court stated "it is undoubtedly true that all citi-
zens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force or
reserved militia of the United States as well as of the States .... ,,29
This position was reaffirmed in United States v. Miller, more than fifty
years later:
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the
debates in the Convention, the history and the legislation of Colo-
nies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. These
25. 53 N.J. at 100, 248 A.2d at 527 (emphasis added).
26. Since 1808, Congress has gradually taken over the task of supplying arms to the
state militias. See, e.g., Act of April 23, 1808, cl. 55, 2 Stat. 490; Act of February 24, 1897,
d. 310, 29 Stat. 592. The states could not waive this right because of art. I, § 8, cl. 15,
which gives the federal government the right to have state militias at its disposal.
27. See Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation, 2 WM.
& MARY L. Ray. 381 (1960); Olds, The Second Amendment and the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms, 46 MIcH. ST. B.J. 15 (1961); Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 A.BA.J. 554 (1965).
28. With the advent of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, the word "male" may
be stricken out.
29. 116 U.S. at 265.
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show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physi-
cally capable of acting in concert for the common defense.80
Since the federal government has the power to put the state National
Guards into its service "to execute the laws of the union,"31 it seems
that the threat of governmental oppression would not be lessened by
the existence of a body which could be called to the bidding of the op-
pressor. Moreover, from 1897 to the present, most of the weapons used
to arm the National Guards have been furnished by the federal govern-
ment under legislation containing the provision that the arms remain
the property of the United States.82
If every citizen is deemed to be a member of the militia, it would
indicate that there is a right to individual possession of firearms in or-
der to act in a military capacity if the need arises. If this right of in-
dividual possession is protected by application of the second amend-
ment to the states, no state legislation could impair a citizen's right to
private possession of a firearm for use as a member of the "militia."
II. ATiRcLE I, SEariON 8, CLAUSES 15 & 16
Article I, section 8, clauses 15 and 16, provide for Congress's power
to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the federal government
and provide that the militia will be organized, armed, and disciplined
by the federal government, reserving to the states the training and ap-
portionment of officers. 33 If one reads the second amendment in light of
these clauses providing for federal supremacy over, and reliance upon,
the state militia, there is a right of the federal government to have at
its disposal an organized militia (National Guard), the right of whose
members to keep and bear arms may not be infringed by the states. 84
This interpretation is gleaned from dicta in Presser, where the Su-
preme Court stated:
30. 307 U.S. at 179.
31. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, d. 15.
32. 32 U.S.C. § 710(a) (1964).
33. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 15 & 16 provide that Congress shall have the power: "15.
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections, and repel Invasions"; "16. To provide for organizing, arming, and dis-
ciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the
service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of
Officers, and the Authority and training of the Militia according to the discipline pre-
scribed by Congress."
34. Rohner, The Right to Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitutional History, 16
CATH. U.L. REV. 53, 68 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Rohner]; Comment, Constitutional
Limitations of Firearms Regulation, 1969 DUKE L.J. 773, 789.
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It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms
constitute the reserved military force or reserved militia of the
United States as well as of the States, and, in view of the preroga-
tive of the general government, as well as its general powers, the
State cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question
[the second amendment] out of view, prohibit the people from
keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of
their rightful source for maintaining public security .... 35
The presence of this federal right to call upon the state militias bears
heavily upon the issue of selective incorporation of the second amend-
ment. Any constitutional decision concerning state initiatives over gun
control must take account of the federal supremacy. The states can-
not be allowed so much power as to be able to impair the ability of the
federal government to call upon state militias. However, whether the
term militia is interpreted as including all able-bodied persons or in
the National Guard sense, there will be no possibility of impairment
by states upon the article I prerogative given the federal government.
III. LIMITATIONS ON SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT
A. Reasonable Regulations
If the second amendment limitation is applied to the states, with
every citizen being deemed a member of the militia, private possession
of firearms is protected. However, this does not mean that there can-
not be certain regulations or restrictions on this private possession. Not
every regulation or restriction is necessarily an "infringement" of this
right. There is, of course, a difference between regulation by registra-
tion and regulation by licensing. Registration, if there is no discretion
on the part of the registering party to refuse the registration, deprives
no one of the right to private possession. On the other hand, licensing
may deny the right to those denied the license. Reasonable licensing,
when used to prevent certain persons from obtaining firearms may not
be a violation of the second amendment as applied to the states.
In 1966, New Jersey enacted one of the better firearms control laws
in the country. 6 This statute requires a person wishing to purchase a
firearm to have an identification card issued by the local police chief.
The purchaser must apply to the police for this card. This enables the
35. 116 U.S. at 265.
36. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 151-1 to -63 (1966).
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police to investigate whether the applicant was ever convicted of a
crime, addicted to narcotics, confined for a mental disorder, or is one
who suffers from a physical defect which would make it unsafe for him
to handle firearms.37 This statute also provides that no permit or iden-
tification card will be issued to any person where the issuance would
not be in the best interest of the public health, safety, or welfare.3
These licensing requirements were upheld by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Burton v. Sills.39 The United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Tot has said:
One could hardly argue seriously that a limitation upon a privi-
lege of possessing weapons was unconstitutional when applied to a
mental patient of the maniac type. The same would be true if the
possessor were a child of immature years.... Such a classification
is entirely reasonable and does not infringe upon the preservation
of the well-regulated militia protected by the Second Amend-
ment.40
B. Reasonable Relationship Test
Just as the second amendment is not absolute as to who may possess
firearms, there is no absolute right to possess every type of firearm. The
Supreme Court has decided that the second amendment does not guar-
antee the right to "keep and bear" any weapon not having a "reason-
able relationship" to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated
militia.
The "reasonable relationship" test, however, was promulgated in
validating a federal statute. This fact presents the problem of whether
the same standards applied to the federal government would be appli-
cable to a state statute if the second amendment is incorporated into
the fourteenth. In the past, there has been considerable debate as to
whether federal standards should be applied to the states as the Court
incorporates most of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment.
The approach of Justice Harlan is that due process does not necessitate
applying federal standards to state action.
The consequence of such an approach to due process as it pertains
to the states is [to] inevitably disregard of all relevant differences
which may exist between state and federal criminal law and its
37. Id. § 2A: 151-33.
38. Id. § 2A: 151-33(d).
39. 53 N.J. 86, 248 A.2d 521 (1968).
40. 131 F.2d 261, 266-67 (1942).
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enforcement. The ultimate result is compelled uniformity, which
is inconsistent with the purpose of our federal system .... 11
Under the selective incorporation approach which has appeared in the
Court's decisions for the last decade, the guarantees incorporated have
been "enforced against the States under the same standards that pro-
tect those personal rights against federal encroachment." 42 Although
states may well be free to develop their own standards, the adoption of
the "reasonable relationship test" may be compelled by logic and prin-
ciples of constitutional interpretation.
In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction
of two men for transporting a "sawed off" shotgun in interstate com-
merce in violation of the National Firearms Act of 1934.43 The barrel
of this shotgun was cut down to less than 18 inches and thus came un-
der the registration requirement of the Act. The Court stated that:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or
use of a shotgun having a barrel of less than 18 inches in length
at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instru-
ment."
Using this principle, a state law regulating, even to the point of pro-
hibition, firearms with no reasonable relationship to the preservation
of efficiency of a well-regulated militia would not be protected by the
second amendment, as applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
A later case has taken issue with the reasonable relationship test of
United States v. Miller. In Cases v. United States,45 the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit stated that the reasonable relationship test
was inadequate since commando units in World War II demonstrated
the utility of any type of weapon. The objection that this court had
with the reasonable relationship test was that almost any weapon could
have some relationship to the militia. Therefore, Congress would be
prevented from regulating the possession or use by private persons
of weapons such as machine guns and mortars, even though it is
41. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 16 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
42. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 164 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1963).
43. Act of June 26, 1934, ch. 757, § 18, 48 Stat. 1236.
44. 307 U.S. at 178.
45. 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942).
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"inconceivable that a private person could have any legitimate rea-
son for having such a weapon." 46 Rather than the "reasonable relation-
ship" test, this court believed that each second amendment challenge
should be decided upon its own facts.47 The weakness of this court's
approach is that it furnished no guidelines whatever, although its criti-
cism of the reasonable relationship test is well-founded. However, the
reasonable relationship test has prevailed in later cases. 48
What firearms, then, have a reasonable relationship to the preserva-
tion and efficiency of a well-regulated militia? It is suggested that hand-
guns (pistols, revolvers, and other firearms under a certain length) do
not have such "reasonable relationship" and thus possession may be
regulated, even to the point of prohibition. In United States v. Tot,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the appellant, a
convicted felon having a pistol in his possession in violation of the Fed-
eral Firearms Act,49 failed to show that the possession of the pistol had
some reasonable relationship to the preservation of a well-regulated
militia.50 In United States v. Miller, where the reasonable relationship
test was first used, the Court held that a shotgun with a barrel of less
than 18 inches did not have such a relationship. 51 There is no reason
why pistols and other handguns should not receive the same treatment
as sawed-off shotguns. Certainly, both are weapons which could be used
in time of war or civil strife but neither is a firearm with much value to
the modem armed forces. 52 Moreover, handguns are relatively useless
for long-range shooting situations which would occur in time of con-
flict.5 3 As Judge George Edwards has stated, "handguns suitable for
concealment are basically the weapons of the assassin, not of the
militia."5 4
There are at least two members of the present Supreme Court who
hold the view that handgun possession may be constitutionally pro-
46. Id. at 922.
47. "While the weapon may be capable of military use, or while at least some familiar-
ity with it might be regarded as of value in training a person to use a comparable weapon
of military type and caliber, still there was no evidence that appellant was or ever has
been a member of any military organization or that his use under the circumstances dis-
closed was in preparation for a military career." Id. at 922-23.
48. United States v. Krasse, 340 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Eckert v. Pennsylvania,
331 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Casson, 288 F. Supp. 86 (D. Del. 1968).
49. Act of June 30, 1938, ch. 850, § 9, 52 Stat. 1252.
50. 131 F.2d at 266.
51. 307 U.S. at 178.
52. C. BAKAL, THE: RJIGHT To BEAR ARMS 130 (1st ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as BAKAL].
53. 38 U. Cus. L. Rav. 185, 207 (1970).
54. BAKALi, supra note 52, at 330.
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hibited. In Adams v. Williams,55 Justices Douglas and Marshall saw fit
to consider the second amendment as well as the fourth amendment,
upon which the majority based their decision. These Justices stated
that:
There is under our decisions no reason why stiff state laws gov-
erning the purchase and possession of pistols may not be enacted.
... There is no reason why all pistols should not be barred to
everyone except the police.56
IV. GUN CONTROL AND THE STATE ARMS PROVISION
Today, thirty-six state constitutions contain "right to bear arms" pro-
visions, in a variety of forms.57 Article I, section 21 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution provides that "the right of the citizens to bear arms in
defense of themselves and the State shall not be questioned." This arms
provision is not identical to the provision of any other state but is simi-
lar to those of seven other states.58 This provision must be interpreted
in order to determine what limitations, if any, it imposes upon state
gun control legislation.
In determining the possible proscriptions of Pennsylvania's constitu-
tional provision, the purposes sought to be protected by the framers
must be examined. Once a protected purpose is identified, any legisla-
tion which allows that purpose to be effectuated by its citizens should
be valid.5 9
A. Individual Self-Protection
The word "themselves" in article I, section 21, indicates that each
citizen may have the individual right to possess a firearm for self-pro-
tection. However, another possible interpretation of "themselves" is
that it refers to the collective body defense of the lives of the state's
55. 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting & Marshall, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 150.
57. For the language of these provisions see Rohner, supra note 34, at 80. This list does
not include Illinois which has recently passed a constitutional amendment:
Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22.
58. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8; IND. CONsr. art. I, § 32; Ky. CONST. art. I, § 7; ORE. CONsr.
art. I, § 27; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24; VT. CONST. I, art. 16; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 24.
59. Rohner, supra note 34, at 78; 38 U. Cm. L. R-Ev. 185, 190 (1970).
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inhabitants, apart from the existence of the state political framework
and perpetuation of state sovereignty. 0
The most extensive article dealing with state arms provisions draws
the conclusion that individual self-defense by the use of firearms is
"probably" a purpose of a provision like Pennsylvania's.0 ' This conclu-
sion is substantiated in Pennsylvania by only one early decision. In
1871, the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Philadelphia County, indi-
cated that the right to carry a loaded pistol under a "well grounded ap-
prehension of peril to his person of life" was guaranteed to a citizen by
Pennsylvania's Declaration of Rights.
6 2
Some of the states with arms provisions similar to Pennsylvania's
provision take the same approach. Although an early case in Florida
took the position that "themselves" refers to the people as a collective
body,63 a later Florida Supreme Court decision held that "themselves"
refers to each individual person's right to self-protection.64 Both Indi-
ana and Kentucky courts have also held that individual self-protection
is a purpose of their arms provisions. 65
Viewing the history of the Pennsylvania provision, other authorities
have concluded that the provision does not provide for an individual
right to possess a firearm for self-defense. 66 Pennsylvania's arms provi-
sion was originally part of a larger article of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion of 1776.67 This article, although not mentioning "militia" is
thought to have been an attempt to paraphrase the militia clause in
Virginia's Bill of Rights.68 Therefore, "people" (later to be changed to
"citizens") was used in a collective sense similar to the concept of a
60. Feller & Gotting, supra note 11, at 55; 38 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 185, 197 (1970).
61. 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 185, 201 (1970).
62. Commonwealth v. McNulty, 28 Legal Intelligencier 389 (Pa. Oyer & Termin. Phila.
Co. 1871).
63. Carlton v. State, 63 Fla. 1, 58 So. 486 (1912). "This section was intended to give the
peop.le the means of protecting themselves against oppression and public outrage."
Davis v. State, 146 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1962). "Doubtless the guarantee intended to
secure to the people the right to carry weapons for their protection .... "
65. Mathews v. State, 237 Ind. 677, 148 N.E.2d 334-(1958); Holland v. Commonwealth,
294 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1956).
66. Feller & Gotting, supra note 11, at 55; Mosk, Gun Control Legislation: Valid and
Necessary, 14 N.Y.L.F. 694, 711 (1968).
67. "That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the
state; and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought
not to be kept up; And that the military should be kept under strict subordination to,
and governed by, the civil power." PA. CONsT. Declaration of Rights, cl. XIII (1776).
68. Feller & Gotting, supra note 11, at 55. Virginia's Bill of Rights of 1776 section 13
reads:
That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms,
is the natural, and safe defense of a free State; that standing armies, in time of peace,
should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases, the military should
be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.
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militia "composed of a body of the people" as found in Virginia's Bill
of Rights and the second amendment. 69 Furthermore, since the re-
mainder of the original article of the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1776, dealt with the prohibition against a standing army and with the
guarantee of civilian control of the military, it is evident that the first
clause of that article, the present article I, section 21, had reference to
collective defense rather than to individual self-protection by the use of
firearms. The use of "themselves and the state" was probably due to
an attempt to distinguish between the body politic and the state politi-
cal framework, rather than being a mere redundancy. 70
The most definitive Pennsylvania decision concerning the scope of
this right to bear arms provision is Commonwealth v. Kreps decided in
1922.71 This case supports the position that collective body defense was
all that was contemplated. The Dauphin County court stated, in cap-
sulizing the history of the arms provision, that:
No private defense was contemplated. When, therefore, Parlia-
ment said that "subjects which are protestants may have arms for
their defense ... " it did not mean for private defense .... The
same safeguards which our English ancestors found necessary to
incorporate into a Bill of Rights was likewise put into the Con-
stitution of the United States and those of the several states .... 72
A reasonable conclusion to be drawn from these materials is that in-
dividual self-protection through the use of firearms is not one of the
purposes of article I, section 21 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and,
therefore, is not protected by that provision.
B. Maintenance of a State Militia
The first phrase of clause XIII of the Declaration of Rights of the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776,73 included the phrase "the right to
bear arms" for the first time in an American document.7 4 Since the
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was "taken almost verbatim from
that of Virginia,"75 and since the first clause of section 13 of the Vir-
69. Feller & Gotting, supra note 11, at 54.
70. Id. at 55. "In other words, 'defense of themselves' referred to the collective defense
of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the state; 'defense of ... the state' referred
to the protection of the state political framework and perpetuation of state sovereignty."
71. 25 Dauph. Co. R. 335 (Pa. C.P. 1922).
72. Id. at 338.
73. See note 65 supra.
74. Feller & Gotting, supra note 11, at 54.
75. Id., citing 3 THE WoRKs OF JOHN ADAMS 222 (1851).
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ginia Bill of Rights76 concerned the militia, it appears that Pennsylva-
nia's "right to bear arms" wording was a paraphrasing of Virginia's
militia provision with its real purpose being the maintenance of a state
militia. This clause was later changed by substituting "citizens" for
"people" and was divorced from the entire article to form what is now
article I, section 21, of the present Pennsylvania Constitution. 7
Thus, the purpose of this provision is to protect the maintenance of
a state militia in order to provide for the collective body defense and
to provide security for the state political framework and state sover-
eignty. The crucial factor in determining article I, section 21, limita-
tions is the composition of the militia. As-suggested previously, the bet-
ter view is that the militia which the second amendment and article I,
section 21 is meant to protect is the active, organized militia, which is
today characterized as the state National Guard.
Kansas has taken the position that the right to bear arms provision
protects the possession of firearms only by members of the organized
state militias. In City of Salina v. Blaksley,7T the Kansas Supreme Court
held that the Kansas' arms provision applied only to the right to bear
arms as a member of the state militia. That court took issue with the
states which allowed their citizens. to carry such arms as are ordinarily
numbers to meet any such emergency.
It is placed on the ground that it was intended that the people
would thereby become accustomed to handling and using such
arms, so that in case of an emergency they would be more or less
prepared for the duties of a soldier. The weakness of this argu-
ment lies in the fact that in nearly every state in the Union there
are provisions for organizing and drilling state militia in sufficient
numbers to meet any such emergency.7 9
C. Permissible Regulation
Not only must any gun control legislation pass the tests of constitu-
tionality under the second amendment and article I, section 21 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, but Such legislation must also be a reason-
able exercise of the police power of the state. In order for a law to be a
valid exercise of the police power, it must not be "unreasonable, un-
duly oppressive or patently beyond the necessities of the case, and the
76. See Va. Bill of Rights of 1776 § 13.
77. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 21 (1779).
78. 72 Kan. 230, 83 P. 619 (1905).
79. Id. at 232, 83 P. at 620 (citations omitted).
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means which it employs must have a real and Substantial relation to
the object sought to be attained."' 0 The courts in Pennsylvania have
consistently held that a reasonable regulation in a gun control law is
a valid exercise of the police power of the Commonwealth."'
Article I, section 21, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the second
amendment, and the police power of the state impose limitations on
the power of the state to enact gun control legislation. Given these lim-
itations, the state legislature could not prohibit ownership of firearms
of all types. This is certainly true if the militia is said to be composed
of every citizen since rifles are the primary weapon of today's soldier
and militiaman. Even if the approach taken is that only the organized
militia is protected, such a prohibition might be an invalid exercise of
the police power of the state. Since the legislation must not be unrea-
sonable, unduly oppressive, or beyond the necessities of the case, such
a law may fail. Rifles and shotguns are used in relatively few of the vio-
lent crimes today, 2 and, therefore, a prohibition upon these firearms
may not be justified since -the evil to be prevented may be small in
comparison with the burden such legislation would place upon hunters
and other sportsmen. Of course, this is not to say that reasonable reg-
ulations, by registration or licensing, cannot be put upon the sale, pur-
chase, or possession of all firearms, including rifles and shotguns.
If a state such as Pennsylvania were to prohibit the sale, purchase,
and possession of handguns, such legislation would not be a violation
of either the second amendment or its state arms provision. As has al-
ready been stated, handguns do not bear a "reasonable relationship" to
the preservation of a well-regulated militia. Likewise, such a prohibi-
tion upon handguns alone would allow the purposes of article I, sec-
tion 21, to be exercised since the members of the militia would still be
80. DePaul v. Kauffman, 441 Pa. 385, 272 A.2d 500 (1971); Gambone v. Commonwealth,
375 Pa. 547, 101 A.2d 634 (1954).
81. Wright v. Commonwealth, 77 Pa. 470 (1875); Commonwealth v. Ray, 218 Pa. Super.
72, 272 A.2d 275 (1970); Commonwealth v. Butler, 189 Pa. Super. 399, 150 A.2d 172 (1959).
See also Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 106, 248 A.2d 521, 531: "Reasonable gun control
legislation is clearly within the police power of -the State and must be accepted by the
individual even though it may impose a restraint or burden upon him."
82. Out of the estimated 17,360 murders in the United States in 1971, only 8 per cent
resulted from the use of rifles and only 6 per cent resulted from the use of shotguns.
Each of these percentages is less than the percentage of murders resulting from the
use of the hands, feet, and other "personal weapons." FBI, UNIFORm CRIME REPORTS 9
(1971). Moreover, only a small percentage of the aggravated assaults and robberies com-
mitted through the use of firearms are committed with rifles or shotguns. G. Newton &
F. Zimring, Firearms and Violence in American Life 49 (Nov. 7, 1969) (staff report to the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence).
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permitted to possess the basic Weapon of the individual soldier-the
rifle. Moreover, because of the limited usefulness of the handgun, there
is no reason why the handgun should be included under the
term "arms" in article I, section 21. This is the approach taken by
Commonwealth v. Kreps,s3 and with the advent of modern weapons,
there is even more rationale for this proposition today. Analogously, a
recent case in Florida, which has a similar constitutional provision,
held a statute declaring it unlawful to possess a short-barreled rifle
(less than 16 inches in length) does not violate Florida's right to bear
arms provision . 4 There is little difference between a short-barreled
rifle and the conventional handgun.
A prohibition on the possession of all handguns would be a valid ex-
ercise of the police power of the state. First of all, such a restriction
would not be unduly oppressive upon the citizens of the state. Hunt-
ing and target shooting with a pistol are relatively unpopular sports, un-
like hunting and target shooting with rifles.85 Thus, such a prohibition
of pistols would place a burden on only a small segment of the popula-
tion. Furthermore, provision could be made for storage of handguns in
police stations or government armories for use in hunting or target
shooting.
Secondly, that a prohibition on the possession of handguns is not
"patently beyond the necessities of the case," can be seen from a study
of the crime statistics. In the United States in 1971, 78 per cent of all
murders with firearms and 51 per cent of all murders were committed
with handguns.86 Out of the 126 law enforcement officers killed in
1971, 94 were killed with handguns.8 7 Further, nine of the ten assassi-
nation attempts upon United States Presidents or candidates for presi-
dent, were committed by the use of handguns.88 There is little ques-
tion today that stricter gun control laws, especially upon the sale, pur-
83. 25 Dauph. Co. at 342; accord, Pierce v. State, 275 P. 393 (Okla. 1929); English v.
State, 35 Tex. 473 (1871). Contra, State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222 (1921); Heaton
v. State, 130 Tenn. 163, 169 S.W. 750 (1914); State v. Rosenthal, 75 Vt. 295, 55 A. 610
(1903).
84. State v. Astore, 258 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1972).
85. "Probably no more than 50,000-60,000 Americans use pistols for serious target
shooting." BAKAL, supra note 52, at 328.
86. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 9 (1971). As an example of handgun use in other
violent crime, in 1967, 86 per cent of all aggravated assaults and 96 per cent of all
robberies were committed by the use of handguns. Newton & Zimring, supra note 80, at 49.
87. FBI, UNIFORM CIUME REPORTS 44 (1971).
88. Successful: Lincoln, Garfield, McKinley, and Robert F. Kennedy. President John
F. Kennedy was murdered by a rifle. Unsuccessful: Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin
Roosevelt, Truman, and George Wallace.
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chase, and possession of handguns, would save many lives each year and
would greatly reduce other violent crimes.8 9
The present Pennsylvania firearms control law, the Uniform Fire-
arms Act,90 is an inadequate remedy for the proliferation of violent
crime through the use of firearms. This law only applies to pistols of
less than twelve inches and sawed-off rifles and shotguns.91 Therefore,
the Act imposes no restrictions upon the sale or possession of rifles or
shotguns to felons or persons with histories of mental illness. Although
the Act provides that the seller of a firearm must mail one copy of the
application for purchase to the local police, 92 there is no affirmative po-
lice duty to investigate the purchaser. Moreover, the Act provides a
waiting period of only 48 hours between the application and receipt
of the firearm. 93 This precludes effective police investigation.
V. CONCLUSION
What is permitted to be done through state legislation does not an-
swer the question of what should be done in the area of firearms con-
trol. There should be two points of attack. First, legislation should be
enacted which will effectively prevent all types of firearms from falling
into the hands of the criminal, the juvenile, the incompetent, or any
other person who is not fit to own a firearm. This could be achieved by
legislation requiring registration and licensing thereby allowing police
investigation of the applicant's background before purchase or con-
tinued possession of a firearm.94 Secondly, legislation should be enacted
to prevent any citizen from obtaining, or retaining, any firearm with
little or no legitimate purpose when the firearm is a favorite weapon of
the criminal and assassin. The handgun is such a firearm. Sale, pur-
chase, and possession of handguns should be prohibited except to law
enforcement officers and to private persons able to show immediate
fear for their personal* safety. Both these legislative initiatives can be
taken within the limits of the federal and state constitutions.
89. See, e.g., Geisel, Roll, & Wettick, The Effectiveness of State and Local Regulation
of Handguns: A Statistical Analysis, 1969 DuKE L.J. 647; Seitz, Firearms, Homicides, and
Gun Control Effectiveness, 6 LAw & SocE'ny REv. 595 (1971); Zimring, Is Gun Control
Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 721 (1968).
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4628 (1963).
91. Id. § 4628(a).
92. Id. § 4628(h).
93. Id.
94. A useful model is the New Jersey Gun Control Act of 1966. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:
151-1 to -63 (1966). In the first year of the operation of the Act, 3,167 applicants for
firearms permits had arrest records. 114 CONG. REc. 14188 (1968).
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There should be no concern by the millions of legitimate owners of
firearms that such legislation is the first step in confiscation of all ,fire-
arms. Aside from the probable constitutional proscriptions on any such
legislation, Congress and the state legislatures must realize that pro-
tection of the home and family, as well as hunting and target shooting,
are legitimate purposes of firearms. Such purposes may be adequately
secured by the private possession of rifles and shotguns-firearms
which are not the tools of the lawless.
In the past decade, a public outcry for more effective gun control
legislation has been heard. The question is now not if, but when,
stronger legislation will be passed. Every citizen should want his state
to enact this needed legislation before another assassination or mass
murder occurs through the use of firearms. This comment is written in
the hope that Pennsylvania will take the lead since, as the late Robert
F. Kennedy once said, "it is past time we wipe this stain of violence
from our land."
THOMAS A. WALLITSCH
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